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The method of normalisation combined with peer ratings is utilised to provide the 
solution to the biased rating problem of mapping group work marks to individual 
marks.  We critically evaluate the method of normalisation following the findings 
of an article of the author which argued against the use of self and/or peer rating 
mechanism. We demonstrate that the findings of that article also hold for the 
method of normalisation as the influence of human behavioural factors are not 
accommodated in the designs. Additionally, we argue that the method (and its 
variants) is rather complicated, where all possible contingencies are not pre-
specified.  It makes the arrangement between tutors and students in conducting 
peer assessments incomplete and unverifiable by a third party. 
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A mechanism known as the Self and Peer Assessment or Ratings (SPA) is utilised 
in higher education to map group work marks to individual marks.  This 
mechanism is also known as Self and Peer Ratings. The SPA originated from the 
idea that in a group work based assessment, it is important to assess both the 
process and product. As the process is not always apparent from the final product 
(e.g. essays, reports), SPA attempts to obtain information by asking group 
members to rate each other’s contribution to the product of the group (Eberly 
Center, 2018; Zhang and Ohland, 2009). Previous research (Magin, 2001; Zhang 
and Ohland, 2009) has identified that this mechanism suffers from a number of 
biases resulting in students’ not revealing the true information of actual 
contribution of group members to the tutor. Therefore, a number of articles have 
attempted to design SPA enabling truthful information transmission from students 
to tutors.  In a previously authored article (Chowdhury, 2019), I questioned the 
effectiveness of these attempts and demonstrated that the interpretation of the 
ratings in the SPA is not possible because of the inherent weakness of not 
accommodating human behavioural factors in those designs. This finding implied 
that SPA should not be utilised to map group marks to individual marks as the 
tutors essentially do not know what the ratings actually mean. 
A challenge to the findings of my previously authored article (Chowdhury, 
2019) comes from the method of normalisation combined with peer assessment 
only. A student cannot influence his or her own mark when peer assessment is 
combined with normalisation. Hence it can be argued that normalisation 
combined with peer assessment takes care of the biases and invalidates the 
findings of my article. A number of variants of normalisation are available. We in 
this paper particularly analyse the method developed by Li (2001) and then further 
developed by Bushell (2006) and Spatar et al. (2015). Spatar et al. (2015) claimed 
to have developed a comprehensive method using normalisation taking a number 
of factors into consideration including the problem of biased reporting.  
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The objective of our paper is to establish that the findings of my previous 
article still hold as the weakness of the mechanism that comes from inherent 
behavioural factors is not taken care of in these methods. The ratings therefore 
remain uninterpretable and can not be granted as truthful.  Neither can the ratings 
be treated as false. In order to accomplish the objective in this paper, we first 
briefly summarise the findings of Chowdhury (2019) followed by an illustration 
of the method of normalisation as in Li (2001), Bushell (2006) and Spatar et al. 
(2015). The discussion and criticism then follows. 
It should be noted that the paper is not against the practice of group work 
in higher education. Group work helps to develop skills considered important in 
the professional world and a vital requirement of graduate recruitment criteria 
(Eberly Center, 2019; University of Birmingham, 2019).  Our article is only 
addressing the issue of assignment of marks in group work based assessments and 
in this context evaluating the practice of normalisation through peer assessment 
which claims to assign individual grades in a fair manner.  
  
 
Findings of Chowdhury (2019): 
 
I, in the article Chowdhury (2019) identified that the practice of self and 
peer assessment can be represented as a strategic form game. A strategic form 
game is defined by three elements (i) the set of players (ii) the set of the strategies 
of the players, and (iii)  the outcomes (utilities) of players from different 
combinations of strategies played  (Maschler et al. 2013, page 77). In the practice 
self and peer assessment (SPA) these three distinct elements can be observed i.e. 
(i) the group members as players (ii) The ratings of SPA as the strategies, and (iii) 
the individual grades as the outcomes of the combinations of strategies. 
 I, therefore, proposed that game theoretic arguments can be utilised to 
predict the possible outcomes of a SPA. According to the game theory literature, a 
player has a dominant strategy if a strategy exists which is always a best response 
for any combination of other players’ strategies (Maschler et al. 2013, page 85-
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86). A rational player is expected to play the dominant strategy of a game. The 
article demonstrated that if utility/satisfaction increases with marks and a player is 
motivated by self-interest only (i.e. indifferent about the mark/satisfaction of 
peers) then the dominant strategy constitutes reporting the ratings as such the best 
possible mark irrespective of the ratings of the other group members is ensured. In 
a generic SPA a student therefore is predicted to report the highest self and the 
lowest peer contributions. The paper also demonstrated that if only peer rating is 
used, a student still has the dominant strategy of rating peers low to increase his or 
her marks. 
However, through studying the data of an actual SPA, I, in the article 
demonstrated that whilst the design allowed for a dominant strategy for each 
player (i.e. students), they did not play their dominant strategies. Hence it is not 
possible to infer from the ratings whether students have reported truthfully or not. 
It implies that the ratings are not interpretable following the criteria set up by the 
tutor. The paper suggested that issues like trust, reciprocity, altruism and guilt 
aversion can influence the reporting of students in similar manners observed by 
the behavioural economists (see Fehr and Schmidt 2006). The assumption of 
indifference, which is vital for working of the SPA, also is unlikely to hold. 
 In the article, I therefore concluded that it is impossible to tell whether the 
ratings are true, false or to what extent human behavioural factors influence the 
reporting. Consequently the ratings cannot be relied upon to map group work 
marks to individual marks. 
 
 
Normalisation and the solution of biased reporting  
 
The problem of biased reporting has been identified by the previous 
researchers even though the structural similarities between SPA and/or PA with a 
game was not identified. No attempt was previously made to understand the 
dominant strategies of a SPA permitted by the design structure. However, as 
mentioned before, the previous research recognised that a student can make an 
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attempt to increase his/her grade by falsely reporting SPA. A solution to this has 
been claimed to come through applying normalisation.  
 At first, we will see that the utilising peer assessment only, which appears 
to be a natural solution does not solve the problem of incentivising misreporting. 
It is demonstrated through Table 1. 
 
 





 Table 1 uses the example proposed by Li (2001), which was later used and 
further developed by Bushell (2006) and Spatar et al. (2015). Li (2001)’s basic 
design consisted of a group with 4 members. The group mark of a piece of work 
submitted by that group was 70. To assign individual mark from the group mark, 
the group members were asked to rate each other’s except for themselves. Li 
(2001) used 4 categories by which ratings of the level of participation (or 
contribution) were conducted.  In each category, a rater (student) submits a rating 
on a 5 point scale ranging from poor to outstanding contribution. The final total 
rating of a student is calculated by adding the ratings under the 4 categories (The 
final rating was used in Bushell 2006 and Spatar et al. 2015). The rating scales 
were, 
  
Poor     - 1 
Below average  - 2 
Average  - 3 
Above average - 4 
Outstanding  - 5 
 
6 
 Following these scales, as there are 4 categories, the maximum possible 
peer rating from a student to another student is 20 and the minimum possible is 4. 
Therefore, the sum of peer ratings of a student from 3 peers ranges from 12 to 60. 
 Table 1 presents the mapping of marks in two panels. The upper panel is 
the benchmark case (as in Li 2001, Bushell 2006 and Spatar et al. 2015) and the 
lower panel shows the effects of misreporting. In the upper half, the names of 
those providing the rating are in the first column and the names of the receivers of 
rating are given in the first row. For example, Peter rates the contribution of John, 
Mary and Janet respectively 14, 17, and 16. The last column shows the total rating 
awarded by a rater, e.g. the total rating awarded by Peter is 47. The sixth row 
shows the total rating received by a rater. For example Peter received rating 16, 16 
and 17 provided respectively by John, Mary and Janet. The total rating received 
by Peter is 49. The last cell of the sixth row shows the average of total rating 
received (or equivalently awarded) by the four raters which is equal to 47.75. The 
seventh row shows the Individual Weighting Factor (IWF) calculated by dividing 
the rating received by the average of the total rating awarded. For example, 
Peter’s  IWF  is 49/47.75=1.026. Therefore, his Individual Mark is GM× IWF = 
70×1.026 = 71.83. 
 It is possible, however, for a student to utilise the conversion method for 
his/her own benefit. It has been depicted in the lower panel in Table 1, where 
Peter awards John the lowest possible rating of 4 instead of 14, which results in 
him effectively awarding himself a higher individual mark 75.80. Note that the IM 
of John has gone down to 52.60, and IMs of Mary and Janet have gone up to 
80.44 and 71.16 respectively.  
 The solution proposed to this problem by Li (2001), and which has been 
largely utilised and extended by Spatar et al. (2015) is implemented by 
normalisation of ratings. In Table 1, we observe that students can increase their 
own marks by rating peers low. This is not possible in the normalisation method 




(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
 
 The first half of Table 2 is the benchmark case which is identical to the 
benchmark case in Table 1. However, in the second half, individual marking 
under simple normalisation (NIM) and adopted method of Spatar et al. (2015) 
have been presented. 
 In order to normalise, the total grade awarded by a rater has been added, 
and then the rating received by an individual from the rater has been divided by 
that added rating. For example, the total rating awarded by Peter is 47. The rating 
awarded to John by Peter is 14. Therefore John’s normalised rating from Peter is 
14/47=0.298. Similarly John’s normalised rating from Mary is 0.356 and 0.286 
from Janet. By adding 0.298, 0.356 and 0.286 John’s Normalised Individual 
Weighting Factor (NIWF) is calculated as 0.939. By multiplying GM and NIWF  
John’s Normalised Individual Mark (NIM) is calculated as 65.74.  The modified 
method suggested by Spatar et al. (2015) results in John receiving a mark of 
67.87. 
   
The method of normalisation claimed to provide a solution to biased 
reporting or the problem of manipulation observed in Table 1. In Table 3, the 
effects of biased reporting on individual marks have been demonstrated. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
 
 In order to make the comparison simple, the top half of Table 3 is 
constructed in the same format as the bottom half of Table 1. Table 3 also needs 
to be compared with Table 2 to understand the impact of normalisation. The lower 
half of Table 3 shows the grade under the simple method of normalisation 
together with a grade using the method proposed by Spatar et al. (2015). Table 3 
shows that Peter awarded John the lowest possible rating of 4. However under 
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normalisation, this does not increase Peter’s grade which remains the same as the 
71.57 awarded in Table 2. Using the Spatar et al. (2015) method, it increases the 
mark marginally from 71.17 to 71.43. The normalisation method therefore gives 
Peter negligible incentive to misreport. It should also be noted that we observe 
some changes of the marks of the peers.  
 As Peter’s mark does not change, one may feel tempted to state that 
normalisation provides a solution to the biased or non-truthful reporting problem. 
However, following the findings of my previous article (Chowdhury, 2019), we 
propose that the method does not solve the problem but adds further 
complications and this is discussed in the next section. 
 
 
Criticism of Normalisation: 
 
In this section we provide criticisms of the use of normalisation which has 
been developed by Li (2001) and furthered by Bushell (2006) and Spatar et al. 
(2015). Our main argument in a nutshell is that problem of SPA is not a problem 
of misreporting instead is a problem of interpretation. However the solutions 
proposed by previous papers address the misreporting problem instead of 
interpretation problem. We also identify that the methods proposed are 
complicated and impractical given the current higher education environment and 
expose tutors to challenges by students. 
 
i. Interpretation problem, friendship bias and sabotage: 
 
 I, in my previous article identified that the designs of the Self and Peer 
Assessment or only Peer Assessment do not take the utility of students into 
consideration. The utility function captures the satisfaction received by the 
students from marks. When the characteristics of a utility function are unknown, 
the interpretation is impossible. The article showed that if the students are 
indifferent, i.e. only motivated by own utility, then false reporting will take place 
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in a way that self will be reported above peers. However, it did not take place in 
the actual ratings of the paper. Hence, the paper concluded that it is impossible to 
identify whether students lied or told the truth.  
 The method of normalisation claims to have solved this problem as 
students can not affect own marks when only peer rating is used. However, it can 
only work if the students are indifferent about the mark of the peers. However it 
does not imply the absence of misreporting as there is no incentive to report what 
is true.  
 On the other hand misreporting is likely if students are not indifferent 
about the marks of peers. One possible source of misreporting is friendship or 
reciprocity bias which has been previously addressed in the literature (Magin 
2001; Falchikov 2005). It is illustrated in Table 4. 
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
 In Table 4, we assumed a benchmark case where the group members 
agreed to rate 12 to each other. Now assume that Peter likes John and decides to 
award 20. It does not decrease Peter’s mark however it increases that of John’s 
and decreases Mary and Janet’s.  This is illustrated in the lower panel of Table 4. 
 Similarly it is also possible to sabotage ratings. Assume for some reason 
Peter does not like John and wants to sabotage by awarding a lower rate. It does 
not change Peter’s own mark but reduces John’s. It also increases Mary and 




(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
 
 It should be now clear that normalisation is subject to friendship bias and 
sabotage of group members. Essentially the method does not account for human 
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behavioural factors. There is no incentive for truthful reporting when students are 
indifferent about the mark of peers. It makes the interpretation of ratings 
impossible as the tutor cannot distinguish between true or false reports. Hence 
whatever the modification is, such as proposed by the normalisation, the inherent 
problem of interpretation remains unresolved.  
 
 
ii. Incomplete contract: 
 
 
In addition to the above stated interpretation problem, the normalisation 
also suffers from the incomplete contract problem. Incomplete contract is defined 
as a contract that cannot specify all contingencies and cannot be verified by a third 
party (Tirole 1999). The arrangement of self and/or peer assessment implies a 
formal contract between group members and the tutor. In the arrangement the 
students are instructed to submit the ratings. However the way normalisation 
works can be described by following instruction: 
 
‘The total rating of your other group members is equal to 1. Allocate ratings to 
the other members according to their contributions as such total rating is equal to 
1.’ 
 
Therefore the instruction to submit ratings and instruction specifying 
actual utilisation are different. Any method that normalises the original rating 
modifies the meaning of the instruction given to students. It consequently 
constitutes a divergence from the original arrangement/contract between tutors 
and students in conducting peer assessment.  
Additionally, although the normalisation uses only simple mathematical 
operations; it requires substantial training for both the tutors and students. The 
training should explain all contingencies including the effects of the friendship 
bias and sabotage. A proper implementation of the method has a substantially 
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high cost (takes more time) implication for both tutors and students. The 
complexity of the mapping process introduces the possibility that the outcomes 
could be the subject of an appeal to a higher academic committee. Because of the 
ambiguity/complexity of the mapping method the decision of the appeal is likely 
to go against tutors. Hence a tutor faces a greater risk from the incomplete 
contract scenario.  
 Many tutors in this regard would interview students ex-post of reporting. It 
further complicates the matter. Modifying marks following ex-post interview 
implies that the students have non-truthfully reported the ratings which again is 
subject to further deliberation of a higher academic committee and this may 
constitute a form of academic offence. It also has substantial additional cost (in 





We praise the academic endeavours that have attempted to find methods of 
mapping group marks to individual marks using self and/or peer assessment. 
However, in light of the criticisms in this paper we would question whether such a 
method is actually attainable. 
 Many now view group work as an integral part of learning in higher 
education. We are also supportive of this view and believe that group learning 
generates substantial experience to students and is valuable in their post education 
careers. However, assigning marks to an individual student in a group work based 
assessment is problematical due to information asymmetry between tutors and 
students. We believe that the subject matter would benefit from an 
interdisciplinary research approach, combining education literature with 
behavioural economics, in an attempt to reconcile the issues highlighted in this 
paper. We would also solicit further endeavour from academicians and educators 
to suggest, if possible, alternatives of self and/or peer assessment in summative 
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The benchmark case in Li (2001), Bushell (2006) and Spatar et al. (2015) 
 
The Benchmark case 





14 17 16 47 
John 16 
 
17 17 50 
Mary 16 16 
 
13 45 
Janet 17 14 18   49 
Total rate received and 
average rating 49 44 52 46** 47.75 
IWF 1.026 0.921 1.089 0.963   
IM=GM* × IWF 71.83 64.50 76.23 67.43   
Manipulation of rating 
Rater/Assesse Peter John Mary Janet 
Total 
Awarded 
Peter  4 17 16 37 
John 16  17 17 50 
Mary 16 16  13 45 
Janet 17 14 18   49 
Total rate received and 
average rating 49 34 52 46 45.25 
IWF 1.083 0.751 1.149 1.017   
IM=GM × IWF 75.80 52.60 80.44 71.16   
*GM (Group mark)=70 
** We have found that in Li (2001) the rating received by Janet adds to 47, 
however Bushell (2006) and Spatar et al. (2015) used 46, we therefore in the 






Use of Normalisation in mapping group marks to individual marks 
 
The Benchmark case 





14 17 16 47 
John 16 
 
17 17 50 
Mary 16 16 
 
13 45 
Janet 17 14 18   49 
Total rate received and 
average rating 49 44 52 46 47.75 
IWF 1.026 0.921 1.089 0.963   
IM=GM × IWF 71.83 64.50 76.23 67.43   
Normalisation of rating and Individual marks 
Rater/Assesse Peter John Mary Janet 
Total 
Awarded 
Peter  0.298 0.362 0.340 1 
John 0.32  0.34 0.34 1 
Mary 0.356 0.356  0.289 1 
Janet 0.347 0.286 0.367   1 
NIWF 1.022 0.939 1.069 0.969  
NIM= GM × NIWF 71.57 65.74 74.83 67.85   










Manipulation of grades and effects on different assessment methods 
 
The Manipulated Benchmark case (Table 1) 





4 17 16 37 
John 16 
 
17 17 50 
Mary 16 16 
 
13 45 
Janet 17 14 18   49 
Total rate received and 
average rating 49 34 52 46 45.25 
IWF 1.083 0.751 1.149 1.017   
IM=GM × IWF 75.80 52.60 80.44 71.16   
Normalisation of rating and Individual marks 
Rater/Assesse Peter John Mary Janet 
Total 
Awarded 
Peter  0.108 0.459 0.432 1 
John 0.320  0.34 0.34 1 
Mary 0.356 0.356  0.289 1 
Janet 0.347 0.286 0.367   1 
NIWF 1.022 0.749 1.167 1.061  
NIM= GM × NIWF 71.57 52.46 81.68 74.29   










Effects of Friendship 
 
The Benchmark case with friendship bias 
Rater/Assesse Peter John Mary Janet 
Total 
Awarded 
Peter  20 12 12 44 
John 12  12 12 36 
Mary 12 12  12 36 
Janet 12 12 12   36 
Total rate received and 
average rating 36 44 36 36 38 
IWF 0.947 1.158 0.947 0.947   
IM=GM × IWF 66.32 81.05 66.32 66.32   
Normalisation of rating and Individual marks 
Rater/Assesse Peter John Mary Janet 
Total 
Awarded 
Peter  0.455 0.273 0.273 1 
John 0.333  0.333 0.333 1 
Mary 0.333 0.333  0.333 1 
Janet 0.333 0.333 0.333   1 
NIWF 1.000 1.121 0.939 0.939  
NIM= GM × NIWF 70.00 78.48 65.76 65.76   










Effects of Sabotage 
 
The Benchmark case with sabotage 
Rater/Assesse Peter John Mary Janet 
Total 
Awarded 
Peter  4 12 12 28 
John 12  12 12 36 
Mary 12 12  12 36 
Janet 12 12 12   36 
Total rate received and 
average rating 36 28 36 36 34 
IWF 1.059 0.824 1.059 1.059   
IM=GM × IWF 74.12 57.65 74.12 74.12 
 
Normalisation of rating and Individual marks 
Rater/Assesse Peter John Mary Janet 
Total 
Awarded 
Peter  0.143 0.429 0.429 1 
John 0.333  0.333 0.333 1 
Mary 0.333 0.333  0.333 1 
Janet 0.333 0.333 0.333   1 
NIWF 1.000 0.810 1.095 1.095  
NIM= GM × NIWF 70.00 56.67 76.67 76.67   
Spatar at el. (2015) 70.00 63.33 74.70 74.70   
 
